

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

9 April 1951

25X1

SUBJECT: Contribution to NIE-32: THE
COMMUNIST MILITARY POSITION IN KOREA AND ITS
EFFECT ON SINO-SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION IN THE
FAR EAST

Under present circumstances it appears that the Communists have no chance to win a decisive military victory in Korea unless substantial increased Soviet support is forthcoming.

A Soviet decision to make a more extensive commitment in Korea will depend largely upon the following factors:
(1) the scale and nature of the support necessary to achieve reasonable assurance of victory; (2) the capability to provide such support; and (3) a willingness to accept the consequences of the probable counteraction.

In regard to the scale and nature of the required commitment, it appears that the Soviets must intervene heavily with air power in addition to any commitment they might make of land and sea forces. To permit decisive ground action, air superiority in the theatre would have to be attained and heavy successful air attacks on UN positions, lines of communications, ports, and shipping would have to be sustained over an extended period.

*USAF Declass/Release
Instructions On File*

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. []
[] DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
65X1
1991

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

With respect to the Soviet capability to carry out an attack of this scope, the Communists have available an air establishment of approximately 6000 aircraft in the Far East. However, only a small proportion of this total could be brought to bear at any one time because of limitations of radius of action and air facilities, and because many would be committed to air defense. Low standards of maintenance and supply difficulties would probably keep the serviceability rate of the aircraft assigned to operations at about 30-40 percent. Therefore, it appears that the number of combat sorties to be expected from the Soviets would not greatly exceed the number the UN forces are capable of flying. On an aircraft for aircraft basis the Soviets would be at a considerable disadvantage against the UN forces. By and large the Soviet aircraft in the Far East are considerably inferior to the aircraft of the UN forces. The only known Communist jets in the Far East are the some 150 now committed to operations and even these have come off second best in every encounter thus far. Soviet air crews and air planners are relatively inexperienced. In the electronics and communications fields, as well as in air facilities, the Soviets would be at a disadvantage. Taking all these things into consideration, it appears that the most the Soviets could accomplish with their air power would be the diversion of a large part of the UN air power from its offensive role. Although this would be serious for the UN, it probably would not be decisive. Sustained air attacks by the Soviets could

Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000800050064-7
well result in prohibitive attrition to the Communist Air Force.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~